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Abstract—Fraud detection is extremely critical for e-commerce
business platforms. It is the intent of the companies to detect
and prevent fraud as early as possible. Utilizing graph structure
data and identifying unexpected dense subgraphs as suspicious is
a category of commonly used fraud detection methods. Among
them, spectral methods solve the problem efficiently but hurt
the performance due to the relaxed constraints. Besides, existing
heuristic methods cannot be accelerated with parallel computa-
tion and fail to control the scope of returned suspicious nodes
because they provide a set of subgraphs with diverse node sizes.
These drawbacks affect the real-world applications of existing
methods. In this paper, we propose an Ensemble based Fraud
DETection (ENSEMFDET) method to scale up fraud detection in
bipartite graphs by decomposing the original problem into sub-
problems on small-sized subgraphs. By oversampling the graph
and solving the subproblems, the ensemble approach further
votes suspicious nodes without sacrificing the prediction accuracy.
Extensive experiments have been done on real transaction data
from JD.com, which is one of the world’s largest e-commerce
platforms. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness,
practicability, and scalability of ENSEMFDET. More specifically,
ENSEMFDET is up to 100x faster than the state-of-the-art
methods due to its parallelism with all aspects of data.
Index Terms—Bipartite Graph, Ensembles, Fraud Detection,
Graph Mining
I. INTRODUCTION
Fraud detection in large scale graph structures is very
important. In many scenes, fraudsters try to manipulate net-
works for personal gain [1]. As online services are becoming
increasingly popular, it attracts fraudsters to look for measures
to abuse their virtual currency system. For example, a large
number of accounts are created and controlled by a group of
fraudsters, and these malicious fraudsters may cash out and
obtain ill-gotten wealth, thereby greatly damaging the entire
virtual currency system.
Among many fraudulent activities, arbitrage frauds that use
online promotional campaigns are common but not easy to
deal with. E-commerce platforms usually launch many promo-
tional campaigns to increase platform clickstream and attract
user consumption. For example, each transaction can enjoy a
5-dollar discount if the transaction cost is greater than $5.01, or
the discount can be a random value within 5 dollars no matter
what the total transaction cost is. Fraudsters usually register
many malicious accounts in batches and control malicious
accounts to make bulk purchases during the promotion period
to illegally profit. This kind of fraud not only damages the
company’s interests, where the costs invested in promotional
activities are not converted into clickstreams but also deprives
many users of the discounts they should have received. How-
ever, fraud behaviors in promotional campaigns are not easy to
detect and defend. Most promotional campaigns will not last
long and change a lot next time. According to our observation
of the business on JD.com, most fraudulent accounts used by
fraudsters will not be reused after a period of time, and the
features of fraud behaviors will also change with the different
promotional campaigns. Therefore, it is difficult to label fraud
behaviors and utilize historical data. In other words, feature-
based supervised learning [34], [27], [11], [29], a classical
way to detect fraud behaviors, is very hard to be applied
in such a scenario. In order to reduce the growing abuse
of promotional campaigns, expert-rule systems are developed
to identify suspicious accounts. However, fraudsters would
update means of fraudulence using techniques such as device
and IP obfuscation to evade the rules, and there are increasing
difficulties in detecting these more sophisticated attacks. In
addition, millions of fake user accounts are being created
every day, and they further reduce the density of attacking
and thus evade related rules. Besides, expert-rule systems
heavily depend on the expert experiences finding in manual
monitoring.
Compared with some camouflage measures to bypass
expert-rule systems, the traces (e.g., links and nodes) left
by fraudsters on graphs are difficult to eliminate. Graph-
based approaches [30], [31], [17], [13] can analyze all events
and users at the same time. And thus they can detect fraud
behaviors and promotion abuse systematically. By finding
the hidden relationships and behavior consistency among all
accounts, graph-based methods can detect different groups of
fraudsters without any label for training which is extremely
expensive and time-consuming to get in the real world. As
a data-driven approach, graph-based methods can reduce the
costs generated by the lagged effect of making rules as well.
Graph-based approaches detect groups of fraudsters by iden-
tifying unexpectedly dense regions of the graph. Intuitively,
graph-based fraud detection methods share the same idea
with density-based clustering approaches: both looking for
subgraphs with a higher density than the remainder of the
graphs/data. The task of graph-based fraud detection is to find
all subgraphs that have anomalous patterns (usually of high
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density) from the provided objective graph. There are two
main types of approaches for this task: spectral methods [30],
[31], [17] and heuristic algorithms [13], [33]. Compared with
spectral methods, the heuristic algorithms commonly have
better performance. However, heuristic methods commonly
detect suspicious subgraphs with diverse sizes, and all nodes in
one suspicious subgraph will be labeled as suspicious nodes.
This property hurts the practicability of heuristic methods in
real-world applications because they will lead to a zigzag
ROC curve and precision-recall curve. Therefore, we cannot
select suspicious nodes by configuring the recall or false
positive rate. Besides, heuristic methods commonly tend to
return the densest block because there is no efficient strategy
to control how many blocks the algorithms should find. The
most important thing is that the heuristic process in algorithms
is sequential and thus it is difficult to be parallelized. These
drawbacks greatly hinder their applications in the real world.
To address the aforementioned drawbacks, we pro-
pose a model, namely Ensemble based Fraud DETection
(ENSEMFDET), in this paper. In ENSEMFDET, we first de-
fine the optimization problem of graph-based fraud detection
corresponding to our business scenarios. Second, we show
how to implement graph-based fraud detection practical by
decomposing the original graph into small-sized subgraphs
so as to lower the search costs. An ensemble framework
is utilized in ENSEMFDET, which employs three structural
sampling methods for the bipartite graph with theoretical
guarantees. The ensemble framework aggregating the outputs
of several subproblems can reduce the overall risk of achieving
a particularly poor suboptimal solution, and thus maintaining
high prediction accuracy. Third, a method FDET is deployed
in ENSEMFDET to detect fraudsters, which enables a more
efficient search for the top-k fraud subgraphs. The selected
parameter k can be determined by a strategy in FDET. In ad-
dition, ENSEMFDET can compute fraud detection in sampled
graphs in parallel, thus accelerating the detection process. Last,
using real-life datasets of promotion campaigns, we conduct
extensive experiments and show that ENSEMFDET for fraud
detection is effective, practical, scalable and stable.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. We review
the related works in Section II. Then we introduce several
important concepts and formulate the problem in Section III.
The proposed model ENSEMFDET is introduced in Section IV,
whose effectiveness is evaluated in Section V. Finally, we
conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Approaches in the field of fraud detection can be classified
into two categories: feature-based and graph-based.
Feature-based approaches model the users and activities
by representing them through a set of attributes, such that
each entity is represented as a vector in a multi-dimensional
space. In order to distinguish normal users from fraudsters, the
appropriate set of attributes should be designed hand-crafted,
so that entities will lie in significantly different regions in this
feature space. With the rise of deep learning, neural networks
have also been used to extract features from fraudsters and
relating events, and accomplish fraud detection through a
classifier [34], [27], [25], [11], [29]. This class of algorithms
often require pre-labeled training data, which are used to find
the distinguishing attributes. These algorithms have been suc-
cessfully used to predict trolls [7], vandals [22], hoaxes [23],
and sockpuppets [21], among several other anomaly entities.
However, obtaining reliable labels is extremely expensive and
time-consuming in real business scenarios, which may limit
us from detecting the fraud in the very early stage. Some of
these feature-based algorithms are also efficient and effective
to find anomaly users from unlabeled training data like linear
models [28], proximity-based models [4], probabilistic models
[20] and ensemble models [26].
Graph-based approaches are designed based on the intuition
that anomalous entities act synchronously, i.e., they often
take similar actions in near-similar times. When representing
entities using their actions in a multi-dimensional space, the
synchronous behavior of anomalous entities will form blocks
with a higher density. Graph-based algorithms aim at identi-
fying these dense-blocks in large-scale behavior logs. These
algorithms have been successfully used to predict ill-gotten
page Likes [3], zombie followers [16], and spam [15]. Graph-
based approaches are more robust when facing adversarial
attacking [13], because any strange behavior would unavoid-
ably generate edges in the graph like ’who-buy-where’ and
’who-buy-what’. There are two main types of approaches in
graph-based algorithms: spectral-based methods and heuristic
methods. Usually, spectral-based methods also identify unex-
pectedly dense regions of the graph and treat related nodes as
suspicious. They try to transform the problem of identifying
dense regions as the graph partitioning problem. Therefore,
there are two different ways to solve the problem. First, by
spectral relaxation, graph partitioning can be efficiently solved
by SVD or eigenvalue decomposition. SPOKEN [30] observes
the ’eigenspokes’ pattern produced by pairs of eigenvectors of
graphs and is later generalized for fraud detection in [17].
FBOX [31] focuses on the residual of SVD to detect attacks
and [15] extends SVD to multimodal data. Several methods
have used HITS-like [19] ideas to detect fraud in graphs
[5], [10], [12], [16], [8]. Heuristic methods also solve the
problem efficiently and effectively. Charikar et al. propose
a heuristic method to find subgraphs with a large average
degree [6], which shows that subgraph average degree can
be optimized with approximation guarantees. Tsourakakis et
al.[33] extend [6] to the K-clique densest subgraph problem.
Hooi et al. [13] propose Fraudar to deal with camouflages
and provide upper bounds on the effectiveness of fraudsters.
However, Fraudar detects fraud subgraphs of different sizes,
and all nodes in a suspicious subgraph will be marked as fraud
nodes. Moreover, Fraudar cannot automatically determine the
number of suspicious subgraphs. ENSEMFDET proposed in
this paper can handle these drawbacks. At the same time, the
parallelism of ENSEMFDET enables it to be more applicable
to larger data.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we will provide several critical definitions
at first, and then formulate the problem we need to handle.
A. Terminology Definition
As an important part of marketing campaigns, e-payment
usually provides many promotional campaigns with interesting
services like a random discount. For example, each transaction
can enjoy a $5 discount if the transaction cost is greater than
$5.01, or the discount can be a random value within 5 dollars
no matter what the total transaction cost is. We observe that
fraudsters register many accounts to make the rules-based anti-
fraud system fail. We can usually represent the information
of marketing campaigns as a bipartite graph, which can be
defined as the ’who buy-from where’ graph:
Definition 1 (’who buy-from where’ graph): Consider user
nodes U = {u1, ..., um}, merchant nodes V = {v1, ..., vn},
and E which denotes the set of connections between U and
V representing a purchase, we define that the bipartite graph
G = (U ∪ V, E) is a ’who buy-from where’ graph.
Based on the ’who buy-from where’ graph, there exist two
clues about the fraudsters according to our observations:
• synchronized behavior: Fraudsters are limited by the time
of promotional campaigns. Basically, Fraudsters need to
achieve a specific goal in a short term. Therefore, suspicious
nodes have extremely synchronized behavior patterns within
a short time, because they are often required to perform
similar tasks together such as payments in specific stores.
• rare behavior: The connectivity patterns among high suspi-
cious nodes are very different from the majority. Usually, the
density of subgraphs composed of highly suspicious nodes
is significantly higher than other parts of the full graph.
Through our analysis of historical transaction data on JD.com,
it is found that there are usually multiple groups of fraudsters
in the same period of promotional campaigns. The fraudsters
of different groups are reflected in the ’who buy-from where’
graph, that is, there are high-density disjoint subgraphs. We
need to find all suspicious groups in a graph.
B. Problem Definition
Based on the ’who buy-from where’ graph, instead of
identifying the densest subgraph, the target of the fraud
detection problem is not only finding the densest subgraph but
also extracting all other unexpected dense subgraphs. In this
paper, we formulate the fraud detection as finding k-disjoint
subgraphs that maximize the sum of densities and propose a
simple strategy to select the parameter k automatically and
stably. Here, we formally define our problem as follows:
Problem Definition: Given a ’who buy-from where’ graph
G = (U ∪ V, E), the fraud detection problem is to find a
group of vertex subsets S = {S1, ..., Skˆ} and Si ⊆ U ∪ V . kˆ
is the selected value of the parameter k, which is determined
by the property of the graph G.
Here, we make use of the density score to measure the
density instead of the average density degree. According to
[13], given a graph G, its density can be effectively measured
with the following density score:
Definition 2 (Density Score): Let the density score φ(G) to
be
1
|U|+ |V|
∑
j∈V
1
log(dj + c)

where dj denotes the node degree of the jth merchant, and c
is a small constant to prevent the denominator from becoming
zero.
The reason for penalizing high-degree merchant nodes in
density score is to keep the detection effective, even in the face
of camouflage. The more detailed explanation can reference
to [13] as well.
Based on the graph density score measure, the objective
function of the proposed fraud detection problem can be
represented as :
max
kˆ∑
i=1
φ(G(Si)) s.t.Sl∩Sm = ∅ l 6= m l,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · , kˆ}.
(1)
Here, G(Si) represents a subgraph which is composed of the
vertex subset Si. It is not hard to prove that Equ. 1 is a NP-
hard problem [2].
IV. PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we introduce the proposed model EN-
SEMFDET. At the very beginning, we introduce three struc-
tural sampling methods with theoretical guarantees. After that,
the fraud detection algorithm FDET will be proposed which
can be conducted for all sampled graphs in parallel. Finally,
we will describe the ensemble approach ENSEMFDET from a
holistic perspective.
A. Sampling methods for bipartite graph
In e-commerce business platforms, the amount of trans-
action data is normally huge, and the response time for
fraud detection is extremely demanding. In order to make
our approach applicable to large scale data in the real world,
we make use of sampling methods to decompose the fraud
detection problem in a large scale graph into multiple smaller
scale graphs which can be solved simultaneously through the
parallel implementation. In this section, we will introduce
multiple sampling choices for bipartite graphs in detail.
1) Why sampling can work: Most of the real-world graphs
are still too large to efficiently acquire, store and process.
In order to facilitate the development and testing of systems
in network domains, it is often necessary to sample smaller
subgraphs from the larger network structure [24]. There are
two different sampling strategies: node sampling and edge
sampling. In classic node sampling, nodes are chosen inde-
pendently and uniformly at random from the original graph
for inclusion in sampled graphs. All edges among the sampled
nodes are added to form the sampled graph. But for a bipartite
graph G = (U ∪ V, E), U is not as the same type as V ,
thus we consider two different sampling strategies further:
one-side node sampling and two-side node sampling. Edge
sampling focuses on the selection of edges rather than nodes
to build sampled subgraphs. Thus, the node selection step in
edge sampling algorithm proceeds by just sampling edges, and
including both nodes when a particular edge is sampled. The
subgraph is created just out of the sampled edges, which means
no extra edges are added in addition to those chosen during
the random selection process. We provide Theorem 1 to prove
we can get a −approximation solution of Equ. 2 if we use
the sampled subgraphs.
Theorem 1 Given an bipartite undirected graph G = (U ∪
V, E), let n be the number of vertices in the graph and c =
Ω(lnn) be the minimum node-degree. We sample edges of G
with probability p = 3(d+2) lnn2c independently to construct a
subgraph G(Si) and set their weights in G(Si) as the original
multiplied by 1p . Then G(Si) is an − approximation of G
under the density metric [9]:
(1− )φ(G(Si)) < φ(G(Si)) < (1 + )φ(G(Si)) (2)
Let fD(q) be the number of nodes of degree q in the original
graph. Let |Vs| be the target number of nodes in the sample
graph. Let pv =
|Vs|
|V| be the probability of sampling a node
in Node Sampling (NS). Let |Es| be the number of sampled
edges in Edge Sampling (ES), then pe =
|Es|
|E| is the probability
of sampling a particular edge in ES. Let E∗[dq] refers to the
expected number of sampled nodes that have degree d = q
in the original graph, where ∗ refers to different sampling
methods like following:
ENS [dq] = fD(q) · pv
EES [dq] = fD(q) · [1− (1− pe)q]
(3)
The above equations show each node has a uniform prob-
ability of being sampled in NS. For ES, the probability of
selection is proportional to a node’s degree. More specifically,
the likelihood of selection corresponds to the complement of
the probability that none of the node’s q edges is sampled.
Thus ES selects high degree nodes with greater probability
than NS. Formally, we have:
Lemma 1: For degree q > log(1−pv)log(1−pe) , ES will sample degree
q nodes at a higher rate than NS (i.e., EES [dq] > ENS [dq]).
2) Random Edge Sampling (RES): RES is the most intu-
itive and simplest choice of sampling methods in a bipartite
graph. The random edge sampling can be conducted with the
following steps:
1. Select a random set of edges Es from G = (U ∪V, E) with
the sample ratio S = |E is|/|E|. Collecting nodes connected
by edges in E is into sets U is and Vis separately.
2. Based on E is, U is and Vis, we can construct the random
sampled subgraph Gis = (U is ∪ Vis, E is).
It’s obvious that RES can sample subgraphs evenly and con-
trol the time consumption of each subgraph is similar. Based
on Lemma 1, RES will sample nodes with larger degrees at a
higher rate. What’s more, from the view of the spectral, RES
is likely to select dense components from the original bipartite
graph with the rise of sample ratio S . Based on the problem
we face, we know that such dense components have a greater
likelihood of containing fraudulent nodes. At the same time,
the sparse part will not be considered in the process, thus the
method prunes low-risk nodes and reduces the hypothetical
space during the procedure of ensemble construction.
3) One-side Node sampling (ONS): A notable difference
between unipartite graphs and bipartite graphs is the node type.
Nodes constituting a unipartite graph only belong to one type,
but a bipartite graph has two types of nodes which can be seen
as two sides of the graph. Obviously, ONS is a straightforward
way to process the sampling of a bipartite graph. ONS can be
operated as the following steps:
1. Construct the adjacency matrix W ∈ R|U|×|V| for the
original bipartite graph G = (U ∪ V, E).
2. Determine the node type to sample. Here, assuming U .
3. According to the sample ratio S = |U is|/|U|, sampling |U is|
rows from W to form the subgraph adjacency matrix W is ,
4. Construct the random sampled subgraph Gis based on Wis.
From the steps above, we can find that determining which
side nodes to sample is a non-trivial option for ONS. Here,
we have summed up some paradigms through practice.
• Task-oriented principle: First of all, we insist that the deci-
sion should depend on the problem to solve. For instance,
if to deal with the link prediction or closeness measurement
problems for one-side nodes, we should sample the target
side nodes in order to measure the closeness with the support
of global and complete information from the other side.
Meanwhile, with the rise of sampled subgraphs, no node
pair will be missed. However, when facing problems relating
to dense subgraph detection, it’s another kind of situation
where we should take other properties into consideration
like the specific topology. We analyze the situation in the
next bullet point.
• Retain topology: We still take the problem relating to dense
subgraph detection as an example. Here, we have a bipartite
graph with Davg(V)  Davg(U) where Davg(U) is the
average degree of U . In response to the task requirement,
we care about retaining the topology of dense components
from the original graph after sampling. Obviously, if we
sample U , the sampled subgraph will become a subgraph
of uniform distribution, especially when Davg(U) ∼ 1. In
contrast, sampling V can retain dense topology from the
original graph effectively. Because once v ∈ V with a high
degree is sampled, the dense components can be extracted.
ONS can conquer disparate structures more effectively. Con-
sidering dense subgraphs problem, it’s more effective to select
denser subgraphs from relatively dense ones after sampling,
and subgraphs that are not very significant to be selected with
the global setting become distinct on sampled graphs.
4) Two-sides Node Sampling (TNS): It’s hard to avoid
thinking about what if we conduct sampling to both sides of
the bipartite graph. In fact, it’s a fairly intuitive idea. From
the view of the adjacency matrix, it is equivalent to sampling
both rows and columns of W and using the cross-section of
these rows and columns to construct the adjacency matrix W is .
Hence the detailed sampling steps are similar to ONS.
Here we need to remind a point to better understand the
number of sampled subgraphs N and the sample ratio S .
Because we sample both sides of the bipartite graph, the
sampled graph is smaller than RES or ONS with the same
sample ratio S . In fact. when S = 0.1, the size of a subgraph
from random edge sampling is 10% of the original one, but
the subgraph sampled from two sides is only near S 2 of the
original graph. So in practice, we usually need to enlarge the
sampling ratio S or increase the number of samples N to
ensure the effectiveness of the two-sides sample. However,
considering the parallel implementation of ENSEMFDET, with
the rise of N , more computing resources need to be occupied
at the same time which may be unacceptable in real-world
scenes. Besides, it’s easy to understand that TNS will preserve
the structure of the graph more finely and make it difficult to
preserve specific topology as needed like ONS, which is an
aspect need to be considered.
B. Fraud DETection(FDET) algorithm based on Heuristic
The sampling methods are able to decompose the large scale
graph into multiple smaller scale graphs. Now, we propose
FDET to complete fraud detections for each sampled subgraph.
As we mentioned in Section III-B, the fraud detection task in
our realistic e-commerce scene is a disjoint case. We start from
considering one natural heuristic for the disjoint case: at each
step, we compute the densest subgraph G(Si) = (Si, Ei) in
the current graph G. Formally, to achieve G(Si), nodes in G
which result in the highest value of density score φ defined
in Definition 2 will be repeatedly obtained. Then we remove
edges in previously detected subgraphs from the current graph
G. Iteratively searching the dense subgraph until we find the
kˆth subgraph or the current graph contains no edges.
Algorithm 1: FDET for Equ. 1
Data: Bipartite Graph G = (U ∪ V, E), density metric φ
Result: Sd = (Ud ∪ Vd)
1 Ud ← ∅, Vd ← ∅;
2 repeat
3 n← |U|+ |V|;
4 Hn ← G;
5 for i = n : 2 do
6 find minimal degree node m in Hi;
7 Hi−1 ← Hi − {m};
8 G(Si) = (Ui ∪ Vi, Ei)←
arg maxHi∈{H2,...,Hn} φ(Hi);
9 Ud ← Ud ∪ Ui;
10 Vd ← Vd ∪ Vi;
11 remove Ei from G;
12 until arg mini ∆2φ(G(Si)) and G 6= ∅;
How to determine kˆ is a very important issue. We insist that
kˆ should be a parameter that exists objectively depending on
how many dense subgraphs exist. Therefore, when detecting
dense subgraphs, we have to truncate the detection process
effectively instead of setting a number or the more the better.
About truncating effective dense components, the basic idea
behind partitioning methods, such as k-means clustering [14],
is to define clusters such that the total intra-cluster variation
or total WSS (within-cluster sum of square) is minimized. The
total WSS measures the compactness of the clustering, and we
want it to be as small as possible. The Elbow method [18],
[32] treats the total WSS as a function of the number of the
clusters: one should choose a number of clusters so that the
total WSS doesn’t improve significantly while adding another
cluster. In this paper, we employ a similar idea to select the kˆ.
We see the total density measure
∑kˆ
i φ(G(Si)) as a function
of kˆ: one should choose a number so that
∑kˆ+1
i φ(G(Si))
doesn’t improve much better. In other words, ∆2φ(G(Si))
which is the second-order finite difference of φ(G(Si)) can
be utilized to measure the improvement of
∑kˆ
i φ(G(Si)), and
min(∆2φ(G(Si))) represents the density score φ suddenly
decreases. Therefore, we can define Truncating Point as:
Definition 3 (Truncating Point):
kˆ = arg min
i
∆2φ(G(Si))
We plot the curve of φ(G(Si)) for multiple sampled graphs
as shown in Figure 1, and one line represents one sampled
graph. It can demonstrate this method is able to find a reason-
able hyperparameter kˆ because all curves are monotonically
decreasing and achieve a similar low score finally which means
detected subgraphs are meaningless after the truncating point
kˆ. In the experiments, we will compare the performances
between a fixed k and the optimal kˆ.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Detected block
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Fig. 1. Scores for each detected block.
By using minimal heap [13], each update can be performed
in O(log(|U| + |V|)) time, totaling O(kˆ|E| log(|U| + |V|))
time because we need |E| updates to node degrees and repeat
kˆ times. We show FDET in Algorithm 1. Typically, the
number kˆ of groups varies from few to few tens. The required
number of components kˆ is often expected to increase with
the network size. However, based on sampling methods, the
large scale graph can be decomposed into multiple smaller
scale graphs. Besides, the algorithm FDET is able to run on
each sampled subgraphs in parallel. After describing graph
sampling methods and the fraud detection algorithm in each
subgraph, we will introduce our proposed model ENSEMFDET
from a holistic view.
C. Ensemble based Framework ENSEMFDET
ENSEMFDET is a general fraud detection method and can
be applied to detect various fraud behaviors in real-world
scenes. The structure of ENSEMFDET is shown in Figure 2.
Meanwhile, the pseudo-code of ENSEMFDET is available in
Algorithm 2.
In ENSEMFDET, the process before applying the aggrega-
tion method can be implemented in parallel. After sampling,
we will apply FDET to all sampled graphs simultaneously
with the multicore environment. The parallel property of
ENSEMFDET is very meaningful and practical because there
are high demands for running time in the real-world where
graphs are very huge in size. Then ENSEMFDET applies the
aggregation method to the results from all sampled graphs to
get the final fraud detection output. In experiments, we choose
the majority voting aggregation method as defined:
Definition 4 (Majority Voting Aggregation Method (MVA)):
The majority voting aggregation method can be described by
this equation:
H (u) =
{
accept if
(∑N
i=1 hi(u)
)
≥ T
reject otherwise.
where hi(u) is the number of the vote-catching of the node u
in sampled subgraph Gis, and the parameter T is a threshold.
The parameter T normally is determined by task require-
ments and the preference for detection results. Although the
heuristic algorithm FDET is able to solve the fraud detection
based on bipartite graphs with near-linear scalability, it is still
unable to control the size of dense subgraphs which may limit
its practicality. The threshold T is able to handle the quantity
of detected suspicious nodes, and we will analyze the impact
of T in Section V-D. In fact, the aggregation methods are
flexible and can be set as the one suitable for the specific
requirement.
V. EXPERIMENTS
To demonstrate the effectiveness, stability, and scalability
of ENSEMFDET, extensive experiments are conducted in three
datasets that come from real transaction data on JD.com. In
this section, we will describe datasets in detail at first. Then the
experimental settings, including experimental setup, evaluation
metrics, and comparison methods, will be introduced. Finally,
we will display the experimental results together with the
parameters impact analysis.
A. Datasets Description
Datasets we used in experiments are based on real transac-
tion data on JD.com, one of the world’s largest e-commerce
business platforms. A set of policies, rules, and models will
determine levels of risk of all transactions on JD.com, and
a subset of them with relatively high risk will be sent for
Algorithm 2: ENSEMFDET
Input: Bipartite Graph G = (U ∪ V, E); Density score metric
φ; Sample Method M; Number of sampled graphs N ;
Sample ratio S ; Voting threshold T ; Majority Voting
Aggregation Method MVA;
Output: Detected sets of fraud nodes Ufinal and Vfinal
1 Ud ← ∅, Vd ← ∅;
2 begin run in parallel
3 for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N } do
4 Apply Sample Method M to G with S and get Gis;
5 Apply FDET to Gis and get Sid = (U id ∪ Vid);
6 Ud ← Ud ∪ U id;
7 Vd ← Vd ∪ Vid;
8 Ufinal ← ∅, Vfinal ← ∅;
9 Apply MVA to Ud, Vd with the voting threshold T ;
10 for u ∈ Ud do
11 if H (u) = accept then
12 Ufinal ← Ufinal ∪ u
13 for v ∈ Vd do
14 if H (v) = accept then
15 Vfinal ← Vfinal ∪ v
TABLE I
STATISTICS OF DATASETS
Dataset# Node:PIN Fraud PIN Node:Merchant Edge
1 454,925 24,247 226,585 1,023,846
2 2,194,325 16,035 120,867 2,790,517
3 4,332,696 101,702 556,634 7,997,696
additional manual checking. A team consisting of experienced
experts in manual checking will review those transactions
carefully and determine if they should be rejected. Once
transactions are rejected, the PIN of users participating trans-
actions will be marked as dangerous and be recorded in
the Blacklist. The Blacklist is used as the ground-truth for
evaluating fraud detection algorithms. After cleaning up the
original mass transaction data, we get PIN-Merchant bipartite
graph (’who buy-from where’ graph) which describes the
trading relationship between users and merchants. For these
three datasets, we also have three corresponding blacklists that
contain dangerous PIN of users as the ground-truth. These
three datasets actually have to be independent of each other,
because they are collected from different time periods, and
the business scene we face is extremely time-sensitive. For
example, one PIN appears in three datasets, but only in one
dataset, it is marked as black which may be due to the theft of
accounts. And later because of some operations like appeals.
the PIN can be removed from the blacklist. The key statistical
data describing datasets can be found in Table I. We hold
the view that in response to this kind of practical problem,
experiments conducted on the datasets from the real-world are
the most valuable and convincing.
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Fig. 2. The Structure of ENSEMFDET
B. Experimental Settings
1) Experimental Setup and Metrics: In the experiments,
ENSEMFDET can be divided into three steps and conduct them
step by step just like the description in Section IV-C. The
key parameters are summarized in Table II , and extensive
experiments with different combinations of parameters are
conducted in order to discover interesting impacts.
TABLE II
PARAMETERS USED IN EXPERIMENTS
Parameters Descriptions
N Number of sampled graph
S Sample ratio
T Voting threshold in aggregation method
R The repetition rate R = S ×N
The main goal of our experiments is to compare the quality
and quantity of the detected fraud nodes, thus we can choose
conventional evaluation metrics to measure the performance.
The methods we test in experiments can all output detected
fraud nodes, thus we can use F1, Recall, Precision as evalu-
ation metrics. It should be noted that normally Accuracy in
fraud detection problems seems not very significant, because
the proportion of fraud samples is quite low.
2) Comparison Methods: The methods used in experiments
are listed as following:
• ENSEMFDET: ENSEMFDET is the model proposed in
this paper. We aim at demonstrating the practicability and
stability of ENSEMFDET and the advantage of the ensemble
framework in time consumption without loss of detection
performance in our experiments.
• ENSEMFDET-FIX-K: In ENSEMFDET-FIX-K, we fix the
number of detected blocks K instead of truncating the
detecting process automatically which is described in Sec-
tion IV-B. The method is used to verify the effectiveness of
the truncation.
• SPOKEN: By spectral relaxation, SPOKEN [30] is able
to find the densest density regions with SVD method.
SPOKEN is not parameter-free to make sure how many
components should be used to estimate the suspicious nodes.
So in our experiments, the number of components is set to
25 as same as the paper described.
• FBOX: FBOX[31] analyzes the reconstruction error and
shows attacks of small enough scale cannot be efficiently
detected in the top-k SVD components. FBOX needs to
set the parameter K which is a determinant factor of the
reconstruction error.
• FRAUDAR: FRAUDAR [13] tries to find a unexpected dense
subgraph which commonly contains high suspicious users.
Based on fair considerations, as an unsupervised learning
method, we will not compare with supervised learning meth-
ods, such as some feature-based models and emerging GNN-
based models [34], [27], [29].
C. Experiment Result
1) Evaluation on Comparison Methods: The experimen-
tal results of all comparison methods in three datasets are
shown in Figure 3. We can find that methods based on
SVD, including SPOKEN and FBOX, are not able to keep a
stable performance in different datasets. Especially for FBOX,
almost completely invalidated on No.1 Dataset: Precision
and Recall are close to 0, but it works on the other two
datasets. It’s obvious that FRAUDAR and ENSEMFDET can get
better performance in all datasets. Because the performance of
FRAUDAR can not be represented with a continuous curve, we
use diamond points to represent experimental results of FRAU-
DAR. Overall, ENSEMFDET has close performance compared
with FRAUDAR. let’s make more detailed comparison from
Figure 4 where we set S as 0.1 and N as 80. The number
of detected nodes is used in the x-axis of Figure 4, because
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Fig. 3. Performance comparison of different methods
in response to the algorithms’ task, the performance has a
comparative value when ENSEMFDET and FRAUDAR detect
the equivalent fraud nodes. From Figure 4(a)- 4(c), we can find
ENSEMFDET and FRAUDAR have similar performance in F1.
However, what we are trying to express from these figures
is not only a similar performance but also the practicability
of ENSEMFDET. ENSEMFDET shows a smooth curve on
Figure 4, because the numbers of fraud nodes being detected
TABLE III
THE COMPARISON OF TIME CONSUMPTION BETWEEN ENSEMFDET AND
FRAUDAR
Dataset #1 Dataset #2 Dataset #3
ENSEMFDET 74.127 sec 162.102 sec 470.508 sec
FRAUDAR 805.533 sec 2365.659 sec 5681.591 sec
in ENSEMFDET are almost continuous with the control of T .
In comparison, the numbers of detected nodes in FRAUDAR
are marked with diamond points, and it’s obvious that their
connection is a polyline. This means that the quantities of
detected nodes FRAUDAR are very discrete and the number
of nodes in the detected blocks is unstable so that we are
unable to control the number of nodes being detected and
select one point that best fits our requirements on the curve.
Besides, on Figure 4(e) we can notice that there are several
marks of FRAUDAR have apparent advantages compared with
ENSEMFDET, but from Figure 4(b) this kind of advantage
disappears when taking F1 into consideration. It reflects Recall
is very too low to be used in the real world. And at the next
point, FRAUDAR is going to be weaker than ENSEMFDET,
which spans almost 20, 000 nodes. Normally, such a huge span
is unacceptable in the business, but ENSEMFDET can be used
through the entire curve which makes it practical in the face
of real-world scenes.
In terms of time consumption, we compared the running
time of ENSEMFDET and FRAUDAR which are both heuristic
methods. Table III shows the running time of experiments
where S = 0.1, N = 80 for ENSEMFDET, and K is fixed
as 30 for FRAUDAR. FRAUDAR and ENSEMFDET both runs
near-linearly in the input size which verifies and ensures the
scalability. Because ENSEMFDET can be parallel and make
use of the truncation strategy to decrease the number of
detected blocks. ENSEMFDET is 10X faster than FRAUDAR.
In theory, Time(ENSEMFDET) < S × Time(FRAUDAR)
which is demonstrated in our experiments. For the smallest
S = 0.01 we tested, ENSEMFDET can be 100x faster due to
its parallelism.
2) Comparison among Sampling Methods : In Sec-
tion IV-A, we analyzed several sampling methods for a bipar-
tite graph, and here experiments are conducted to demonstrate
our strategy and analysis. The Precision-Recall curves in
Figure 5 come from the experiments conducted on the No.3
dataset where S = 0.1 and R = 8. At first, from Figure 5 we
can find the performance of Node PIN Bagging (apply ONS as
the sampling method in ENSEMFDET) is worst, but the curve
of Node Merchant Bagging is much better. In fact, the perfor-
mance verifies our analysis in Section IV-A3. In this dataset,
the graph with Davg(Merchant) Davg(PIN) leads to the
failure of retaining the dense topology from the original graph
effectively by Node PIN Bagging. Conversely, Node Merchant
Bagging can achieve better performance with the support
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Fig. 4. Performance and properties Analysis between ENSEMFDET and FRAUDAR
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Fig. 5. Performance comparison among different sampling methods in
ENSEMFDET.
of keeping critical topology. However, some sampled graphs
coming from Node Merchant Bagging can be very large in size
due to some nodes with a very high degree. Although we set
S as 0.1, the size of some sampled graphs can reach 30% of
the original one which results in the higher time-consumption
of parallel computation. Under this circumstance, we can
discover Node Merchant Bagging has better performance.
Besides, the similar and stable performance of Node Merchant
Bagging, Two-sides Node Bagging and Random Edge Bagging
reflects the stability of ENSEMFDET to a certain extent.
3) Verification of the truncating point: Figure 6 displays the
results from a comparative experiment between ENSEMFDET
and ENSEMFDET-FIX-K where the number of detected blocks
k is fixed instead of truncating the detecting process au-
tomatically. We set k = 30 for ENSEMFDET-FIX-K, and
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Fig. 6. Performance comparison between ENSEMFDET and ENSEMFDET-
FIX-K.
ENSEMFDET is based on the truncating point. In experiments,
we also record the detected blocks number of ENSEMFDET,
and all of the records are smaller than 15. The performance ex-
pressed by the Precision-Recall curve shows ENSEMFDET can
achieve better outcomes than ENSEMFDET-FIX-K. Although
ENSEMFDET-FIX-K can get higher Recall with the increase
of k, actually Precision has been close to random selection.
This kind of high Recall is meaningless and these blocks after
truncation are not of value as we defined before. Therefore, the
comparison verifies the effectiveness of the truncation strategy
which can even level up the performance in Precision. What’s
more, the time-consumption has also been greatly reduced,
because ENSEMFDET only need to detect less than half of k
sets for ENSEMFDET-FIX-K in experiments.
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Fig. 7. Performance Analysis under different N when S = 0.1
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Fig. 8. Performance Analysis under different S when fixing S ×N = 1.
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Fig. 9. Performance Analysis under different T when fixing S = 0.1 and N = 80.
D. Impacts of various parameters
In this section, we evaluate the impacts of parameters shown
in Table II. We conducte experiments, where the sampling
method is fixed as RES, in all three datasets, but only show
the results on the No.3 dataset for the reason of the pages
limitation when analyzing N and S . It should be emphasized
that the impacts are consistent across the three datasets in our
experiments.
1) Impact of N : In order to evaluate the impact of the
parameter N , we fixed S as 0.1, and N changed within {10,
20, 40, 80}. The Precision-Recall curve, F1, Precision and
Recall are displayed in Figure 7. Here we have to explain
why the number of detected nodes is used in the x-axis
of Figure 7(b)- 7(d). Obviously, we doesn’t mention the
control of the last parameter T consistent in the comparative
experiments. In fact, when the parameter N is not the same,
the consistent T in not reasonable instead, because in this
case there is a huge difference in the total number of votes
behind the same T . Thus for the sake of fairness, we compare
performance when ENSEMFDET detects the equivalent fraud
nodes under different N .
The results show that ENSEMFDET achieves better perfor-
mance with a rise of N . In fact, this elevation of performance
comes directly from the nature of the bagging method. How-
ever, we should note that the improvement in performance
is not significant, especially with the increase of N . When
comparing N = 40 and N = 80, we can find the improvement
has become negligible. At the same time, the rise of the cost
of equipments is enormous which is not a fair trade-off. In
addition, we can also discover that ENSEMFDET is very stable
when N ∈ {10, 20, 40, 80} which means the repetition rate
R is between 1 and 8 times. The stability actually makes
ENSEMFDET has loose requirements for the computational
environment: even if there are not enough parallel computing
cores, ENSEMFDET can still achieve relatively stable and
acceptable performance.
2) Impact of S : To evaluate the impact of S , we fixed
S × N = 1, instead of setting N as a constant value. The
reason why we choose such an experimental setting is that
the same repetition rate R is fairer for points and edges in
the bipartite graphs. Besides, R itself is determined by the
S and N , so after the analysis of S and N , no additional
analysis is needed for the dependent variable R. The Figure 8
shows the Precision-Recall curve, F1, Precision and Recall in
the experiments with S ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1}. From Figure 8(a)-
8(d), we have two major findings. On the one hand, we can
see that the rise of S can bring a certain improvement in
performance. We should remind that S will determine the
size of sampled subgraphs, and the graphs in the real-world
have a very large scale normally. A sampled subgraph with
a relatively large scale still challenges the storage structure
and the single computing core which is against the original
intention of ENSEMFDET. Thus we don’t pay much attention
to the performance improvement with the rise of S . On the
other hand, stability is also shown in this set of experiments.
When S = 0.01, the performance shown in Figure 8 is still
close to the one of S = 0.1. It means that when facing a large-
scale graph structure, the stability of ENSEMFDET allows you
to sample the graph to a much smaller size without losing
a lot of performance. Of course, when sampling large-scale
graphs to ones of smaller size, N will increase to keep R
constant. But we think this trade-off can be done according
to task requirements and equipment conditions. If you are
more concerned about time consumption with enough parallel
computing cores or the original graph is too large to deal with,
you can set a smaller S . Otherwise, if the performance is more
critical or the original graph itself is not too large to handle, a
relatively large S is a good choice. In fact, parameters S and
N let ENSEMFDET very flexible enough to adapt to a variety
of scenarios rather than make ENSEMFDET complicated to be
manipulated.
3) Impact of T : The results shown in Figure 9 come
from the set of experiments with S = 0.1, N = 80 and
T ∈ {1, 2, . . . 39, 40}. Obviously, the experiment results show
that Precision would go up and Recall would drop with the
rise of T . The phenomenon is easy to understand because the
fraud nodes with more votes are equivalent to having a higher
risk in multiple sampled graphs. Meanwhile, the number of
detected nodes will decrease with the increase of the threshold
T which necessarily leads to the fall of Recall. We can find the
curves are smooth and monotonous in Figure 9(c)- 9(d) which
is a nice property that can be exploited. Based on the curves,
we can determine T in response to the task requirements: do
we prefer to reduce the detecting error rate or to try to find
the fraud nodes as many as possible. In this case, we have a
definite direction when we need to tune the parameter T .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an ensemble approach EN-
SEMFDET to solve the fraud detection problem in large
graphs. First, we formulate the optimization problem for fraud
detection according to our business scenarios. ENSEMFDET
scales up fraud detection through the ensemble framework,
and we analyze the sampling methods in bipartite graphs as
well. A heuristic method FDET, which is one critical part
of ENSEMFDET, is proposed to detect dense subgraphs. The
FDET can also speed up the search process through an efficient
truncation. Extensive experiments conducted on three real-
world datasets demonstrate that ENSEMFDET is effective,
scalable, and stable. After successful experiments on real data,
ENSEMFDET has been deployed in the risk control department
of JD.com for further tests.
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